Foreword

Although conflict and disasters are the main drivers of forced displacement, other factors include rapid urbanization, generalized violence, and human rights violations. Displaced people are particularly vulnerable due to the sudden loss of homes, livelihoods, and social networks, which often results in extreme poverty, insecurity, and limited access to basic services such as health care and sanitation. They also face heightened risks of violence and exploitation. People displaced by conflict are especially vulnerable to climate risks because they often settle in marginal, hazard-prone areas and lack the resources needed to adapt to or recover from extreme weather. Having already lost assets and support systems, they are more exposed to repeated disasters and are frequently excluded from early warning systems and disaster risk reduction planning. Forcibly displaced populations, particularly those uprooted by natural disasters and climate-related hazards, face a compounding cycle of risk, often exchanging one set of vulnerabilities for another in host or resettlement areas, and becoming trapped in poverty and marginalization. Children, women, and the elderly are the most vulnerable due to dependence, limited mobility or autonomy, and greater exposure to exploitation, health risks, and economic insecurity. Pre-existing inequalities such as poverty, gender discrimination, and age-related fragility are further intensified by conflict and climate shocks, leading to repeated displacement and reduced access to protection and essential services.

By 2025, more than 139 million people are projected to be forcibly displaced worldwide due to persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights abuses, either as refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), according to UNHCR. Over the past decade, displacement driven by conflict and violence has surged, nearly doubling since 2014, alongside a tripling of internal displacement in Africa over one and a half decades. Natural disasters triggered a record 45.8 million new internal displacements in 2024 alone, with nearly 265 million movements driven by climate or other disasters in the decade preceding 2024. Climate refugees remain largely uncounted and overlooked, even as populations at high risk from rising seas have risen from 160 million to 260 million over the past three decades—mostly in poorer developing nations and small island states. While conflict remains the primary driver, climate change intensifies an already severe crisis, causing repeated displacement as conflicts persist and disasters accumulate, disproportionately affecting the world’s most vulnerable populations, including refugees, IDPs, and host communities.

While refugees face overlapping challenges—including the loss of livelihoods, unsafe and inadequate housing, limited access to healthcare, food insecurity, language and cultural barriers, disrupted education, psychological trauma, family separation, disability-related exclusion, and prolonged uncertainty that makes rebuilding stable lives extremely difficult—countries that provide asylum face equally complex and far-reaching pressures that strain national infrastructure, economies, public services, and social cohesion, particularly in low- and middle-income nations that host the majority of the world’s displaced populations. Refugee inflows can place heavy pressure on already scarce local resources and infrastructure, often increasing costs and fueling social tensions despite humanitarian assistance and some localized economic benefits. At the same time, refugees frequently encounter barriers to formal employment and legal work rights, while host communities may experience intensified job competition, rising living costs, overburdened public services, and growing friction over limited resources. In many settings, refugee settlements and camps can also accelerate environmental degradation by straining water, land, and food systems, disproportionately affecting the poorest host communities. Overcrowded living conditions, inadequate WASH services, and limited healthcare access further turn many refugee settlements into hotspots for disease transmission, increasing the spread of infectious illnesses and worsening overall health outcomes for both displaced and nearby populations. The analysis of countries that host displaced populations discusses that predominantly low- and middle-income nations face significant strain from large-scale displacement driven by conflict and climate shocks, affecting economies, public services, and social cohesion. It notes that these pressures lead to fiscal burdens, labor market disruption, environmental stress, and heightened health and social tensions within host communities. At the same time, it emphasizes that effective integration and international cooperation can help transform displacement into long-term developmental and economic gains.

Since the onset of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023, more than 6 million people have been displaced across the Middle East, affecting over a dozen countries. In Lebanon alone, roughly one in four people is a refugee, and one in five children lacks stable housing—marking a stark reversal for a country once called the “Switzerland of the Middle East.” As of early 2026, Lebanon continues to host the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, with nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees and about half a million Palestinian refugees, despite more than half a million Syrians having returned in recent years. If proposals for the so-called “Gazafication” of southern Lebanon as a buffer zone, or the politicization of a religious narrative tied to a projected “Greater Israel” extending toward the Litani River, advance, they would likely deepen regional instability and displacement. By April 2026, nearly 1.2 million people had been uprooted—many for a second time within months—with about 14% of the territory under evacuation orders amid worsening shortages of food, fuel, water, and shelter. The Russia–Ukraine War has further deepened Lebanon’s economic crisis by intensifying food and energy shortages, driving record inflation, and exposing fragile supply chains already weakened by the Beirut port explosion. This has left minimal grain reserves and triggered recurring panic over shortages. Amid broader Middle East conflicts, Lebanon’s economy contracted by about 5.7–6.6% in 2024, pushing cumulative GDP losses beyond 38% since 2019 and reflecting a $4.2 billion hit to consumption and exports, alongside worsening fiscal and monetary fragility. By early 2026, Lebanon’s economy teeters between internal collapse and competing U.S.–China influence, as Western aid contrasts with China’s increasingly attractive infrastructure-driven support. The chapter on Lebanon portrays a compounding national collapse driven by economic freefall, pandemic shocks, infrastructural devastation, climate stress, and conflict-induced disruptions that have severely weakened livelihoods and state capacity, while refugee pressures and regional instability further intensify resource scarcity, food insecurity, and systemic strain.

Jordan, home to iconic landmarks such as Petra, Jerash, and major biblical sites, has long positioned itself as a regional mediator in Middle East peace efforts and a consistent refuge for displaced populations. Since 1995, it has maintained a fixed exchange rate (of 1 USD = 0.709 JOD), supported by foreign reserves of about $20 billion in 2024, helping preserve monetary stability and control inflation despite persistent regional and domestic economic pressures. As of early 2026, the country hosts more than 2.5 million Palestinian refugees and has historically accommodated about 1.4 million Syrian refugees, with reports indicating that over 185,000 Syrians returned from Jordan to Syria between December 2024 and mid-February 2026. Jordan has also borne a heavy financial burden from hosting Syrian refugees since 2011, with annual costs estimated at $2–2.5 billion (around 5–6% of GDP) and cumulative expenses exceeding $10 billion by 2016. Meanwhile, intensified Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon in 2026 further deepened regional displacement, with over 200,000 Syrian refugees and Lebanese transiting through Syria toward Jordan, adding new pressure on an already strained humanitarian situation. Since 1989, Jordan’s repeated IMF loan programs have failed to stabilize its economy, with public debt surpassing 92% of GDP by May 2025, while post-COVID youth unemployment—persistently above 40%—and poverty levels exceeding 15% have continued to rise. Corruption concerns, highlighted by the 2021 Pandora Papers’ allegations of offshore-linked luxury property holdings worth over $100 million tied to King Abdullah II, have further intensified scrutiny of governance amid ongoing aid dependence. Climate change has intensified Jordan’s status as the world’s second most water-stressed nation, worsening water scarcity, agricultural decline, and infrastructure strain amid rising heatwaves and droughts, threatening long-term economic stability. The Ukraine war indirectly worsened Jordan’s post-pandemic recovery by driving up food and energy costs and straining its trade balance, while the Red Sea crisis (2023–24) disrupted trade through Aqaba and weakened tourism, slowing growth to about 2.4% in 2024 amid persistent unemployment and debt pressures. Jordan has also navigated US–China tensions by relying on U.S. aid and security while attracting Chinese investment in infrastructure and green energy, balancing geopolitical risks with limited diversification gains. However, heavy reliance on U.S. assistance—exceeding $1 billion annually, accounting for roughly 40% of overseas development aid in 2023 and rising to about $1.7 billion by 2025—has left Jordan vulnerable to external political pressure, culminating in the 2025 Trump Gaza “relocation” proposal that triggered a diplomatic crisis and forced rejection amid fears of economic strain and national instability. Overall, the chapter on Jordan discusses how massive refugee inflows, combined with pandemic-driven contraction, high debt, chronic unemployment, and climate stress, have placed severe strain on its social and economic systems, while overlapping regional and global shocks have deepened vulnerability, poverty, food insecurity, and dependence on limited international aid.

Therefore, forced displacement driven by disasters, urbanization, conflicts and human rights violations, leaving affected populations highly vulnerable due to loss of shelter, livelihoods, and essential services. They face compounded risks of poverty, exploitation, climate hazards, and exclusion from protection systems, with women, children, and the elderly most severely affected. Host countries bear significant economic, social, environmental, and public service pressures, even as large-scale displacement continues to rise globally. Studying these dynamics is essential for understanding shared global responsibility, improving resilience, and designing policies that transform displacement challenges into opportunities for inclusive development through cooperation and sustainable planning.